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Abstract
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, courts have in-
corporated the efficient capital markets hypothesis as an analytical tool in securities fraud cases.
Nevertheless, recent turmoil in the financial markets and a growing chorus of scholarship chal-
lenging traditional notions of market efficiency have caused some courts to reconsider the role of
the efficient capital markets hypothesis in securities fraud litigation. This Note analyzes a ques-
tion that has split the circuits and marks the intersection of market efficiency and securities fraud:
how quickly must an equity security depreciate in price following the publication of a corrective
disclosure for a plaintiff to plead and prove loss causation? Part I introduces the efficient capital
markets hypothesis, securities fraud actions, and the ways in which courts have traditionally em-
ployed concepts of market efficiency into their analyses. Part II analyzes the circuit split regarding
the speed with which the market must incorporate information into price for a plaintiff to properly
plead and prove loss causation. Finally, Part III argues that courts should resist the temptation to
draw bright-line rules in the context of loss causation and should engage each case on its facts
by analyzing the efficiency of the relevant market during each event giving rise to the fraud and
economic loss.
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ABSTRACT 
Since the Supreme Court’s landmark holding in Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson, courts have incorporated the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis as an analytical tool in securities fraud cases.  
Nevertheless, recent turmoil in the financial markets and a growing 
chorus of scholarship challenging traditional notions of market 
efficiency have caused some courts to reconsider the role of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis in securities fraud litigation.  
This Note analyzes a question that has split the circuits and marks 
the intersection of market efficiency and securities fraud:  how 
quickly must an equity security depreciate in price following the 
publication of a corrective disclosure for a plaintiff to plead and 
prove loss causation?  Part I introduces the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis, securities fraud actions, and the ways in which courts 
have traditionally employed concepts of market efficiency into their 
analyses.  Part II analyzes the circuit split regarding the speed with 
which the market must incorporate information into price for a 
plaintiff to properly plead and prove loss causation.  Finally, Part III 
argues that courts should resist the temptation to draw bright-line 
rules in the context of loss causation and should engage each case on 
its facts by analyzing the efficiency of the relevant market during 
each event giving rise to the fraud and economic loss. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is an old joke, widely told among economists, 
about an economist strolling down the street with a 
companion when they come upon a $100 bill [laying] on 
the ground. As the companion reaches down to pick it 
up, the economist says “Don’t bother—if it were a real 
$100 bill, someone would have already picked it up.”1 
This joke is representative of a widely endorsed economic theory—
the efficient capital markets hypothesis (“ECMH”)—taken to its logical 
extreme.2  Developed in its contemporary form by the Chicago School 
of Economics, the ECMH posits that in “efficient” markets, the prices of 
securities accurately reflect all publicly available information.3  Over the 
                                                                                                                 
 1. ANDREW W. LO & CRAIG MACKINLAY, A NON-RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL 
STREET § 1.2 (1999). 
 2. See id.; see also Michael C. Jensen, Some Anomalous Evidence Regarding 
Market Efficiency, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 95, 95 (1978). 
 3. This Note found the following sources helpful in navigating the rich and vast 
body of scholarship regarding the ECMH. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970); see also 
JUSTIN FOX, THE MYTH OF THE RATIONAL MARKET: A HISTORY OF RISK, REWARD, AND 
DELUSION ON WALL STREET (2009); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good 
Finance, Bad Economics: An Analysis of the Fraud-On-The-Market Theory, 42 STAN. 
L. REV. 1059 (1987); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of 
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984); Daniel R. Fischel, Use of Modern 
Finance Theory in Securities Fraud Cases Involving Actively Traded Securities, 38 
BUS. LAW. 1 (1982); Jensen, supra note 2. 
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course of the last four decades, the ECMH has had a monumental 
influence on securities litigation, particularly in the context of Rule 10b-
5 securities fraud.4  This Note examines a question that has split the 
circuits: how quickly must an equity security depreciate in price 
following the release of a corrective disclosure for a plaintiff to prove 
the element of loss causation?  Part I provides a brief explanation of the 
ECMH, Rule 10b-5, and the ways in which at least three elements of 
Rule 10b-5 have been shaped by judicial endorsement of the ECMH.  
Part II examines the circuit split regarding this issue and discusses 
recent case law addressing the rapid incorporation of information into 
securities prices.  Part III takes the position that courts should adopt a 
fact-specific rule with respect to loss causation and resist the temptation 
to apply any bright-line rule based on the ECMH. 
I. ECONOMIC AND LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. THE EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS HYPOTHESIS 
The contemporary version of the ECMH,5 and the version that has 
had the clearest impact on legal analyses in the Rule 10b-5 context,6 was 
first articulated by University of Chicago Booth School of Business 
economist Eugene F. Fama.7  In his 1970 work entitled Efficient Capital 
Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, Fama outlined a 
framework of market efficiency in the context of three categories8: weak 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: 
Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 851, 851 (1992); see also Jill E. Fisch, 
Picking A Winner, 20 J. CORP. L. 451, 463 (1995) (reviewing ROBERTA ROMANO, THE 
GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993)). 
 5. The notion of efficient pricing and efficient markets far predates Fama.  
Scholars including Adam Smith, Jules Regnault, Louis Bachelier, and perhaps even 
Thomas Aquinas and Aristotle have commented on market price efficiency.  See FOX, 
supra note 3, at xiii. 
 6. See Langevoort, supra note 4, at 852 n.7. 
 7. See Faculty Directory: Eugene F. Fama, CHICAGO BOOTH, 
http://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/bio.aspx?person_id=12824813568 (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2012). 
 8. Strictly speaking, Fama’s work did not categorize markets but rather relied on 
empirical data to define characteristics of a particular market with respect to 
information.  In terms of methodology, Fama utilized conditional expected returns 
described notationally as 
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form, semi-strong form, and strong form.9  In weak form markets, prices 
of securities10 reflect only historical price data of that security.11  
Accordingly, an investor trading in a weak form market who possesses 
any information more recent than historical price data with respect to a 
security could turn a profit by trading on the basis of the recent 
information.12  In semi-strong markets, prices of securities accurately 
reflect all publicly available information.13  In a semi-strong form 
market, contrary to a weak form market, an investor who possesses 
publicly available information would not be able to turn a profit by 
trading on the basis of that information because the market would have 
already incorporated that information into the prices of securities.14  
Finally, in a strong form market, all information—including information 
that is available only to groups with “monopolistic access,” such as 
corporate insiders and designated market makers—is reflected in the 
prices of securities.15  Accordingly, even corporate insiders who seek to 
trade on the basis of material non-public information would be unable to 
turn a profit because the market would have already priced in such 
information.16  Despite Fama’s neatly divided categories of market 
efficiency, it is important to realize that the data behind the ECMH 
                                                                                                                 
Conditional on relevant information, the expected return (i.e. expected price at time 
t+1) is a function of the information available to the market – or risk.  The expected 
return of the price of security j at time t+1 is a function of the current (at time t) price of 
the security and the expected one period percentage return given some set of relevant 
information.  On a market-wide scale, such prices will approach equilibrium and cancel 
out irrational outliers.  It is also important to note that Fama listed three characteristics 
sufficient, although not necessary, to achieve a (semi-strong form) efficient market.  
Such factors include: (1) zero transaction costs associated with trading securities; (2) 
freely available information accessible by all market participants; and (3) unanimous 
agreement on the part of market participants with respect to the current implications of 
information on future prices.  See Fama, supra note 3, at 387. 
 9. See id. at 384. 
 10. The term “securities” in this Note refers to equity securities, and more 
specifically, to common stock.  It does not refer to debt securities or convertible 
debt/equity hybrid instruments. 
 11. See Fama, supra note 3, at 388. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. See id. at 388, 415. 
 16. See id. at 388. 
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predates the ECMH itself, at least in its contemporary form.17  Put 
another way, Fama did not suggest that there are three types of markets, 
which always behave in accordance with certain abstract economic 
principles.18  Rather, Fama argued that there are three general types of 
market behavior, which can be seen in any market at any given time.19 
Of Fama’s three categories, the semi-strong form is most widely 
endorsed by economists,20 traders,21 jurists,22 and securities regulators.23  
In fact, less than a decade after Fama’s landmark work, Michael Jensen, 
a famous financial economist in his own right, boldly stated that “there 
is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical 
evidence supporting it than the Efficient [Capital] Market Hypothesis.”24  
From Jensen’s comment to the present day, the ECMH “began its 
                                                                                                                 
 17. See id. at 383 (“Though we proceed from theory to empirical work, to keep the 
proper historical perspective we should note to a large extent that the empirical work in 
this area preceded the development of the theory.”); see also Gilson & Kraakman, 
supra note 3, at 552 (“[L]egal users of the ECMH literature have been, by and large, 
confronted with a body of empirical evidence in search of a causative theory.”). 
 18. See Fama, supra note 3, at 387 (“[A] frictionless market in which all 
information is freely available and investors agree on its implications is, of course, not 
descriptive of markets met in practice.”). 
 19. See id. 
 20. See, e.g., Jensen, supra note 2, at 95; Fama, supra note 3, at 383, 387; Eugene 
F. Fama et al., The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10 Int’l Econ. Rev. 
1 (1969) [hereinafter Fama, Adjustment of Stock Prices], available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=321524## (“There is an impressive 
body of empirical evidence which indicates that successive price changes in individual 
common stocks are very nearly independent.  [Economic papers and research] show 
rigorously that independence of successive price changes is consistent with an 
‘efficient’ market, i.e., a market that adjusts rapidly to new information.”). 
 21. The belief that stock prices reflect all available information at any given time 
led, at least in part, to the belief that investors, even professional investors, could not 
outperform the market with any consistency.  Such belief gave rise to index fund-
investment strategies, which provide investors with an opportunity to invest in funds 
that seek merely to simulate, rather than outperform, the market as a whole. See 
BURTON G. MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET: THE BEST INVESTMENT 
ADVICE FOR THE NEW CENTURY (1999). 
 22. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 4, at 851; Thomas Lee Hazen, Rational 
Investments, Speculation, or Gambling?: Derivative Securities and Financial Futures 
and Their Effect on the Underlying Capital Markets, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 987, 987 
(1992); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 3, at 549. 
 23. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 4, at 851; Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC as 
a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the Process of Policy 
Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 537–38 (1990). 
 24. Jensen, supra note 2, at 95; see Langevoort, supra note 4, at 853 n.8. 
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remarkable transition from theory to doctrine”25 and embedded itself in 
policies underlying securities laws, regulations, and jurisprudence.26  In 
1988, after some years in the federal circuit courts,27 the Supreme Court 
famously adopted the ECMH in the landmark decision of Basic, Inc. v. 
Levinson.28 
B. SECTION 10(b) SECURITIES FRAUD 
In the midst of the Great Depression, Congress, passed the 
Securities Act of 193329 (the “Securities Act”) and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act” and, together with the 
Securities Act, the “Securities Laws”)30 in an effort to prevent future 
instances of rampant fraud and manipulation.31  These landmark pieces 
of legislation were based on two overarching principles: disclosure of 
information and prevention of fraud.32 
Following a period of unbridled abuse in the securities markets, 
Congress, as a matter of public policy, decided that the best and least 
intrusive way33 to ensure market integrity was to provide investors with 
                                                                                                                 
 25. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 853. 
 26. Id. at 851. 
 27. See, e.g., Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 (3d Cir. 1986); Blackie v. 
Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 28. 485 U.S. 224 (1988). 
 29. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73–38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2006)). 
 30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 111–72, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2006). 
 31. See H.R. REP. NO. 73–85 (1933) (“During the post-war decade some 50 billions 
of new securities were floated in the United States.  Fully half or $25,000,000,000 
worth of securities floated during this period have been proved to be worthless. . . .  The 
flotation of such a mass of essentially fraudulent securities was made possible because 
of the complete abandonment by many underwriters and dealers in securities of those 
standards of fair, honest, and prudent dealing that should be basic to the encouragement 
of investment in any enterprise.”); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 
723, 727–28 (1975). 
 32. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the 
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 669 (1984). 
 33. The Securities Act and the Exchange Act expressly do not involve merit review 
of securities at the federal level.  Certain state securities laws and regulations, known 
colloquially as “Blue Sky Laws,” do involve the review of the merits and characteristics 
of securities by state regulators. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 223, 232 
(1988) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court repeatedly has described the ‘fundamental purpose’ of 
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information about the various companies whose securities were issued 
to, and traded by, the public.34  Accordingly, the Securities Act, which 
governs capital formation in the primary market,35 requires companies 
that wish to issue securities to the public to file a registration statement36 
containing detailed information about both the securities and the 
company at large with the United States Securities and Exchange 
Commission (the “SEC”). This registration statement is in turn made 
available to the public.37  Similarly, the Exchange Act, which governs, 
inter alia, securities that trade in secondary markets,38 requires reporting 
                                                                                                                 
the [Securities Laws] as implementing a ‘philosophy of full disclosure.’” (quoting Santa 
Fe Indus. Inc. v. Green 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977))); JAMES D. COX ET AL., 
SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (6th ed. 2009) (“Disclosure is the 
remedy the Securities Act embraces for this malady. . . . Sunlight is said to be the best 
of disinfectants: electric light the most efficient policeman.” (quoting LOUIS D. 
BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY 62 (1914))). 
 34. S. REP. NO. 73–729, at 5 (1934) (noting that one of the “principal problems 
with which the [Exchange Act] deals” is “the secrecy surrounding the financial 
condition of corporations which invite the public to purchase their securities”); see Blue 
Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 728 (noting that a primary purpose of the Securities Act and 
the Exchange Act was to ensure disclosure to investors); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra 
note 32, at 684 (commenting on the importance of disclosure, both at the time of 
issuance and at regular intervals thereafter, as a key goal of the Securities Laws). 
 35. The primary market refers to the sale of securities from an issuer to an investor.  
If the sale of securities refers to the first such sale for the company issuing the 
securities, then the sale is referred to as an initial public offering or an IPO.  See 1 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §§ 2.0, 2.2 (6th ed. 2009). 
 36. There are various exceptions to the registration process required by the 
Securities Act. See, e.g., Regulation D, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.508 (2006) (providing 
three exemptions from registration based on the amount of the issuance and the net 
worth of the investors); Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251–.263 (2006) (providing 
exemption from registration for small offerings, totaling no more than $5 million in the 
aggregate, upon the submission of the minimal disclosure requirements of Form 1-A). 
 37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77f (requiring the filing of a registration statement and payment 
of a registration fee); 77g (requiring registration to contain information specified by 
section 77aa); 77aa (requiring issuers to disclose various facts regarding the company, 
its operations, and control persons).  Prior to the passage of the Exchange Act in 1934, 
the Federal Trade Commission was the governmental agency charged with regulating 
the securities industry.  The SEC was created by Section 4 of the Exchange Act, and 
has been the primary regulator of the securities industry from 1934 to the present day. 
15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006). 
 38. The secondary market refers to the sale of securities that have already been 
issued.  Purchase and sale in the secondary market is referred to as secondary trading.  
Secondary trading can take place in a face-to-face transaction or in an impersonal 
securities market such as the New York Stock Exchange.  See generally COX ET AL., 
supra note 33, at 2–3. 
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companies39 to make disclosures at regular intervals following initial 
issuance.40  Taken together, these reporting requirements demonstrate 
Congress’ unequivocal position that the disclosure of information to the 
marketplace best equips investors to make sound, rational investment 
decisions.41  As SEC Commissioner Troy A. Paredes recently stated, the 
securities laws are principally based on a policy of “transparency, 
achieved through disclosure.”42 
 In addition to various disclosure requirements, Congress included a 
number of antifraud provisions in both the Securities Act and the 
Exchange Act.43  These antifraud provisions give teeth to the Securities 
Laws by providing investors with redress44 against companies that fail to 
                                                                                                                 
 39. Reporting companies include all companies with a class of securities registered 
under Section 12 of the Exchange Act, all companies that have executed a primary 
offering to the public by means of a registration statement as required by 15 U.S.C. § 
77f, and any company with 500 or more shareholders and $10 million or more in total 
assets.  These reporting companies are often referred to as “public companies.” See 
COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 7–8. 
 40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78l, 78m (2006).  Secondary trading refers to the purchase and 
sale of securities that have already been issued. 
 41. S. REP. NO. 73–729, at 1–5 (1934). 
 42. Troy A. Paredes, Commissioner, SEC, Keynote Address at the Fordham 
University School of Law: A.A. Sommer, Jr. Lecture on Corporate, Securities and 
Financial Law (Oct. 27, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/ 
spch102711tap.htm. 
 43. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2006) (providing for 
civil liability in the case of material misrepresentations and/or omissions in registration 
statements); § 12(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (providing for civil liability in the form of 
excision of the purchase price in the case of the offer or sale of a security by means of a 
prospectus or oral statement containing a material misstatement or omission); § 17, 15 
U.S.C. § 77q (authorizing SEC enforcement actions for violations of the Securities Act, 
including, inter alia, violations of the anti-fraud provisions); Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (making it unlawful to use or employ any manipulative 
device or contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a security); § 21A, 15 
U.S.C. § 77u-1 (providing for civil penalties in instances of insider trading). 
 44. See Kardon v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognizing 
an implied private right of action under Rule 10b-5); see also Superintendent of Ins. Of 
the State of New York v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971) (“It is 
now established that a private right of action is implied under s[ection] 10(b)” of the 
Exchange Act.).  Additionally, the antifraud provisions create rights of action for 
securities regulators – chiefly the SEC and, in the criminal context, the Department of 
Justice – as well. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (authorizing 
SEC enforcement actions for violations of the Securities Act); § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) 
(authorizing the SEC to seek injunctions in order to prevent ongoing violations of the 
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comply with, inter alia, disclosure requirements.45  Of these antifraud 
provisions, the most widely used are Exchange Act section 10(b)46—the 
“catchall provision”47—and Rule 10b-5,48 promulgated thereunder, 
which provide investors with a private cause of action49 against 
companies engaging in manipulative or deceptive practices.50  To 
succeed on a Rule 10b-5 claim, a private plaintiff need plead and 
prove51: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) scienter;52 (3) 
connection with a purchase or sale of a security;53 (4) reliance; (5) 
economic loss;54 and (6) loss causation.55 
                                                                                                                 
Securities Act); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (authorizing the 
SEC to investigate apparent violations of the Exchange Act and any rules promulgated 
thereunder); § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff (criminalizing false statements made in periodic 
filings required by the Exchange Act). 
 45. See, e.g., Kardon, 69 F. Supp. at 512; Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 13 n.9.  
 46. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006). 
 47. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980) (“Section 10(b) is 
aptly described as a catchall provision.”). 
 48. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012). 
 49. See Kardon, 69 F. Supp. 512 (holding that there is an implied private cause of 
action under Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5); see also Bankers Life, 404 U.S. at 13 
n.9 (“It is now established that a private right of action is implied under [§] 10(b).”). 
 50. 15 U.S.C. §78j(b). 
 51. This Note frequently uses terms such as “establish,” “demonstrate,” or “plead 
and prove.”  Unless otherwise specifically indicated, all such arguments refer to 
standards that must be met to succeed on the merits, not merely to survive a motion to 
dismiss.  
 52. Scienter is a term borrowed from common law fraud that refers to an 
individual’s state of mind. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1463 (9th ed. 2009); see also 
Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 45 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting the 
common law origin of the term scienter as a state of mind requirement).  To satisfy the 
element of scienter in a Rule 10b-5 securities fraud case, a plaintiff needs to plead and 
prove that the individual who has omitted material information or who has made a 
material misstatement either intended to do so or should have known that her actions 
would result in such materially misleading information reaching the marketplace.  It is 
important to note that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 raised the 
pleading standard with respect to, inter alia, scienter in Rule 10b-5 securities fraud 
actions by requiring plaintiffs to “state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference that the defendant acted with the required state of mind.”  15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4(b)(2) (2006).  The Supreme Court interpreted this language in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor 
Issues & Rights, Ltd. to require a complaint to provide an inference of intent that is as 
“cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference.” 551 U.S. 308, 314 
(2007). 
 53. The element of connection to a purchase or sale stands for the proposition that 
no person may recover damages via Rule 10b-5 without having actually purchased or 
sold a security.  See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 745–46 
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C. ELEMENTS OF RULE 10b-5 IN AN EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKET  
1. Materiality 
In the context of securities fraud, materiality refers to the objective 
import of a particular piece of information from a reasonable investor’s 
perspective.56  The Supreme Court first defined the concept of 
materiality in the context of an alleged factual omission from proxy 
materials in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway.57  In TSC Industries, 
Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, framed the concept of 
materiality in terms of whether there exists “a substantial likelihood that 
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by a 
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the total mix of 
information made available.”58  A dozen years later, in the landmark 
decision Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,59 the Supreme Court “expressly 
adopt[ed] the TSC Industries standard of materiality for the § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5 context.”60  A determination of materiality requires a highly 
                                                                                                                 
(1975) (“[I]t would be insufficient for a plaintiff to prove that he had failed to purchase 
or sell stock by reason of a defendant’s violation of Rule 10b-5.” (citing Birnbaum v. 
Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1952))); see also HAZEN, supra note 35, § 
12.7[3][B].  Accordingly, a complaint alleging that the plaintiff would have purchased 
or sold a security but for the defendant’s material misrepresentation or omission will 
not survive a motion to dismiss.  See Cohen v. Stratosphere Corp., 115 F.3d 695, 702 
(9th Cir. 1997) (affirming the dismissal of a 10b-5 claim because the plaintiff lacked 
standing due to the lack of a purchase or sale). 
 54. The element of economic loss stands for the proposition that an investor must 
suffer an actual monetary loss in order to bring a securities fraud action that will survive 
a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., McFeeley v. Florig, 966 F. Supp. 378, 384 (E.D. Pa. 
1997); King v. Sharp, 63 F.R.D. 60, 63–64 (N.D. Tex. 1974). 
 55. See In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 2010) 
(citing Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341–42 (2005)). 
 56. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988). 
 57. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. 
 58. Id. at 449.  Justice Stevens did not participate in the disposition of the case. 
 59. 485 U.S. 224 (1988).   
 60. Id. at 231-32 (1988).  It is worth noting that Basic, likely the most important 
modern securities fraud case handed down by the Supreme Court, was a plurality 
opinion. 
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fact-specific inquiry to evaluate the objective import of the particular 
statement in the context of all other available information.61 
Facially, neither TSC Industries nor Basic requires any inquiry into 
market efficiency to determine if a statement or omission is material.62  
Rather, each case embraces the disclosure mandates embedded in the 
Securities Laws and requires companies to undertake an ex ante analysis 
of the import of a piece of information from a reasonable investor’s 
perspective.63  Some courts, however, undertake an ex post analysis of 
materiality by asking the simpler, empirical question—did the 
information in question cause a significant change in the price of the 
security?64  As discussed in more detail below,65 this approach runs afoul 
in two principal ways.  First, it provides courts with the benefit of 
hindsight, while affording reporting companies no such luxury.66  
Second, it conflates the element of materiality with reliance and loss 
causation, rather than analyzing each element of Rule 10b-5 
separately.67 
2. Reliance 
The element of reliance establishes a causal link between the 
defendant’s material misstatement and the plaintiff’s decision to buy or 
sell.68  The most obvious way to establish reliance is for the plaintiff to 
plead and prove that they read the defendant’s material misstatement 
                                                                                                                 
 61. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 236 (1988) (stating that materiality is “an 
inherently fact-specific finding”); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 
628, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (commenting on the “fact-intensive inquiry that accompanies 
any analysis of materiality”). 
 62. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32; TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. 
 63. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231; TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449. 
 64. See, e.g., Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000); In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Fischel, supra note 3, at 4. 
 65. See infra notes 200–25 and accompanying text.  
 66. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 
Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 243.100(a) (2010) (requiring public disclosure of 
previously material nonpublic information that has been leaked to a third party without 
regard for the effect of the information on the company’s stock price); see also HAZEN, 
supra note 38, § 12.19. 
 67. See Fischel, supra note 3, at 4. But see Semerenko v. Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 
165, 180 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 13.5B (3d ed. 1995)) (“The reliance requirement is a corollary of 
materiality.”). 
 68. Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723, 728 (11th Cir. 1989) (citing Lipton v. 
Documentation, Inc., 734 F.2d 740 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
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and consequently decided to purchase or sell on the basis of that 
incorrect or misleading information.69  Reliance of this type is referred 
to as direct reliance.70 
In addition to direct reliance, the Supreme Court has adopted two 
theories of so-called presumptive reliance.71  In Affiliated Ute Citizens of 
Utah v. United States,72 the Supreme Court held that reliance may be 
presumed when a defendant omitted a material fact.73  Because it would 
be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a plaintiff to prove that they 
relied on the absence of certain information, the Court in Affiliated Ute 
held that “[a]ll that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material in 
the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them 
important” in deciding whether to buy or sell.74 
In Basic, the Supreme Court again extended the reliance element of 
Rule 10b-5 and held that reliance may be presumed when a plaintiff 
purchased or sold a security in an “impersonal, efficient market” 
following the misstatement or omission of a material fact.75  Known as 
the fraud-on-the-market theory (“FOTM”), the holding in Basic 
incorporated the ECMH into Rule 10b-5 jurisprudence.76  In so doing, 
the Court reasoned that an investor who transacts in a security in an 
efficient market does so in reliance on the price of that security, which, 
in turn, reflects all available information, including any material 
misstatements or omissions, about that security.77 
The more foundational question with respect to the FOTM, of 
whether the market is efficient, is often dispensed with quickly by the 
                                                                                                                 
 69. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 241–42; Peil v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154, 1160–61 
(3d Cir. 1986); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905–06 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 70. See, e.g., Basic, 485 U.S. at 242; Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61. 
 71. It should be noted that the circuits are currently split on a third possible 
presumption of reliance known as the fraud-created-the-market theory.  That theory 
presumes that investors rely not on the price of securities but rather on the integrity of 
the market itself. See, e.g., Matt Silverman, Note, Fraud Created the Market: 
Presuming Reliance in Rule 10b-5 Primary Securities Market Fraud Litigation, 79 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1787 (2011); Julie A. Herzog, Fraud Created the Market: An Unwise 
and Unwarranted Extension of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
359 (1995). 
 72. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). 
 73. Id. at153–54. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Basic, 485 U.S. at 246, 248. 
 76. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242; see also Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61.   
 77. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 242 (citing Peil, 806 F.2d at 1160–61). 
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courts.78  In large, liquid trading environments, such as the New York 
Stock Exchange, market efficiency is presumed.79  In over-the-counter 
markets,80 courts generally consider expert testimony and look to factors 
such as (1) weekly trading volume; (2) the number of securities analysts 
following the company in question; (3) the number of market makers 
with respect to the security in question; (4) the company’s eligibility to 
file a Form S-3 Registration Statement;81 and (5) “empirical facts 
showing a cause and effect relationship between unexpected corporate 
events or financial releases and an immediate response in stock price.”82 
It is important to note that a defendant may rebut both the Affiliated 
Ute and Basic presumptions of reliance by showing that the plaintiff did 
not actively rely on the material misstatement or omission.83  As a 
practical matter, because the overwhelming majority of securities fraud 
class actions settle, and such rebuttal would occur at trial, rebutting an 
alleged presumption of reliance hardly ever occurs.84 
3. Loss Causation 
The element of loss causation refers to “the causal connection 
between the material misrepresentation and the loss.”85  In securities 
fraud, as in common law fraud,86 it is insufficient to demonstrate mere 
                                                                                                                 
 78. Silverman, supra note 71, at 1787. 
 79. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1277 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 80. See HAZEN, supra note 35, § 1.1. 
 81. COX ET AL., supra note 33, at 184–86 (explaining that form S-3 provides 
certain established issuers the opportunity to register classes of securities in a simpler, 
streamlined manner by allowing for, inter alia, the integration of previous filings into 
an issuer’s registration statement). 
 82. Cammer, 711 F. Supp. at 1286–87. 
 83. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 153–54 (1972); see also Jeffrey L. Oldham, Comment, Taking “Efficient Markets” 
Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the Private Securities Litigation Act, 97 
NW. U. L. REV. 995, 997 (2003); Silverman, supra note 71, at 1800 nn.116–18. 
 84. See In re Oxford Health Plans, Inc. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 42, 47 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 
1998) (“An overwhelming percentage of securities class actions are settled . . . .”) 
(citing Joseph A. Grundfest & Michael A. Perino, Ten Things We Know and Ten Things 
We Don’t Know About the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 1015 
PLI/Corp. 1015, 1027 (1997)); see also Oldham, supra note 83, at 1005; Silverman, 
supra note 71, at 1800 n.117. 
 85. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005). 
 86. See In re Cendant Corp. Sec. Litig., 76 F. Supp. 2d 531, 534 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(stating that Rule 10b-5 fraud, “although statutory in origin, sounds in the common law 
of fraud and deceit and retains, in modified form, the common law elements of duty, 
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correlation between the defendant’s misstatement and the plaintiff’s 
economic loss.87  Rather, to avoid Rule 10b-5 from being used as a form 
of “investors’ insurance,”88 the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s 
material misstatement was in a “reasonably direct, or proximate, way 
responsible” for the plaintiff’s economic loss.89  Take, for instance, the 
following example.  On Monday, ABC Company makes a material 
misstatement.  On Tuesday, Investor X purchases securities of ABC 
Company relying on that material misstatement, either directly or via the 
reliance presumptions set forth in Affiliated Ute or Basic.  On 
Wednesday, ABC Company releases a statement correcting the material 
misstatement it made on Monday (referred to as a corrective disclosure).  
After the corrective disclosure is released, the price of ABC Company’s 
securities declines significantly and Investor X, who sold her securities 
thereafter, suffers an economic loss.  For Investor X to properly plead 
and prove loss causation in this hypothetical situation, she would need to 
demonstrate that the fraud, revealed to the market by means of a 
corrective disclosure, caused her price of the securities to depreciate 
and, therefore, caused their economic loss.90  In the rare instance of trial, 
plaintiffs generally attempt to prove loss causation via expert testimony, 
in which the plaintiff’s expert presents statistical data, usually in the 
form of an event study,91 that seeks to establish a causal link between the 
corrective disclosure and the economic loss.92  Generally speaking, 
defendants also utilize expert testimony to attempt to rebut or discredit 
                                                                                                                 
breach, causation, and damages) (citing Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 
534, 547 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 87. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
 88. Id. at 345 (citing Basic, 485 U.S. at 252 (White, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part)) (“[A]llowing recovery in the face of affirmative evidence of 
nonreliance would effectively convert Rule 10b-5 into a scheme of investor’s 
insurance.”). 
 89. In re Sahlen & Assocs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 773 F. Supp. 342, 359 (S.D. Fla. 
1991); see HAZEN, supra note 35, § 12.11. 
 90. See Dura, 544 U.S. at 342. 
 91. An event study is a form of statistical regression analysis that seeks to 
determine the causal link between two events. See Michael J. Kaufman & John M. 
Wunderlich, Regressing: The Troubling Dispositive Role of Event Studies in Securities 
Fraud Litigation, 15 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 183, 195 (2009). 
 92. See id. 
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the evidence presented by the plaintiff’s expert, resulting in a so-called 
“battle of the experts.”93 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
It is clear that to succeed on the merits in a Rule 10b-5 claim, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant’s previous material 
misstatements, revealed to the market by means of a corrective 
disclosure, caused the plaintiff’s economic loss.94  Since Dura, this has 
been established as black-letter law.95  One point that is not clear, 
however, is how quickly the price of a security must depreciate after the 
release of a corrective disclosure.  This question has split those circuits 
that have provided an opinion into two camps.  The Second, Third, and 
Eleventh Circuits require a security to depreciate “immediately” 
following the release of a corrective disclosure.  Conversely, the Fifth, 
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits draw no bright-line rules and engage each case 
on its facts.  On March 7, 2011, the Supreme Court declined to resolve 
this split of authority.96 
A. IMMEDIATE DEPRECIATION REQUIRED 
The Second Circuit, Third Circuit, and Eleventh Circuit all require 
an immediate depreciation in the price of a security following the 
release of a corrective disclosure. Absent such a showing, a complaint 
alleging Rule 10b-5 securities fraud will not survive a motion to 
dismiss.97  Although each case turns on its own facts, it is important to 
note that in each case discussed below, the plaintiffs pled reliance based 
                                                                                                                 
 93. See id.; see also Martis Alex & Michael W. Stocker, Role of the Event Study in 
Loss Causation Analysis, 242 N.Y. L.J. 36 (2009). 
 94. Dura, 544 U.S. at 336. 
 95. Cf. Find What Investor Grp. v. FindWhat.com, 658 F.3d 1282, 1316–17 (11th 
Cir. 2011) (holding that defendants can be liable under Rule 10b-5 for failure to take 
affirmative steps to limit the period during which a security is trading at an inflated 
price); see also Lyle Roberts, Repeating Falsehoods, THE 10B-5 DAILY (Oct. 7, 2011, 
10:10 PM), http://www.the10b-5daily.com/archives/001154.html. 
 96. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir. 
June 23, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011). 
 97. See, e.g., In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 
2010); Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 2010); Oran v. 
Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000). 
206 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
on FOTM.98  Accordingly, at the time of transaction, the relevant district 
courts presumed that the plaintiffs purchased securities in an efficient 
market. 
The Third Circuit, in Oran v. Stafford, was the first to consider and 
opine on how fast an efficient market incorporates information.99  In 
Oran, the plaintiff class alleged that American Home Products Corp. 
(“AHP”), a major pharmaceutical company, made material 
misstatements and omissions about the safety of two weight-loss 
drugs—Pondimin and Redux—that doctors often prescribed in tandem 
and colloquially referred to as “fen-phen.”100  According to the plaintiffs 
allegations, AHP learned about heart valve abnormalities in fen-phen 
patients as early as February 1994 and, although AHP looked into the 
matter internally, failed to disclose any such information to its 
investors.101  On July 8, 1997, AHP, the Food and Drug Administration 
(the “FDA”), and others issued a joint press release that disclosed 
reports of heart valve abnormalities in a population of fen-phen patients, 
emphasized the seriousness of these reports, and noted that there was no 
conclusive evidence of a causal relationship between fen-phen and heart 
valve abnormalities.102  AHP’s stock price did not decline.103  Two 
months later, on September 12, 1997, the FDA showed AHP data 
indicating that 92 of 291 fen-phen patients developed heart valve 
abnormalities.104  On September 15, 1997, the next business day, AHP 
pulled fen-phen from the market and issued a press release projecting 
lost profits of $0.14 per share for fiscal year 1997 and fiscal year 
                                                                                                                 
 98. See, e.g., Complaint, Oran v. Stafford, 34 F. Supp. 2d 906 (D.N.J. 1999) (No. 
97-4513); Complaint at 110, In re Omnicom Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 400 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 02-CV-4483); Thompson, 610 F.3d at 680 (Tjoflat, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“I will read [the plaintiff’s] Rule 10b-5 claim broadly to 
invoke the fraud-on-the-market doctrine.”).   
 99. 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000).  It is important to note that Oran was decided five 
years before Dura—the seminal Supreme Court case regarding loss causation.  In this 
regard, one could argue that Oran is not relevant to the issue at hand both because it 
predates Dura and because it does not comment on the issue of loss causation but rather 
engages in a post hoc analysis of materiality.  As argued below, the Third Circuit’s 
approach in Oran improperly frames the concept of loss causation in the context of 
materiality, which should be analyzed separately in the context of Rule 10b-5 litigation. 
 100. Id. at 279. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 280. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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1998.105  AHP’s stock price dropped 311/16 points, to 73¼.106   The next 
day, despite a Wall Street Journal article warning about possible class 
action suits, AHP’s stock gained slightly.107  On September 17, 1997, 
both the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times published articles 
indicating that AHP knew of abnormalities since at least March of 1997, 
and likely faced substantial liability.108  Subsequently, AHP’s stock price 
dropped 41/4 points.109  Plaintiffs brought suit alleging Rule 10b-5 
securities fraud.110  The District of New Jersey dismissed the suit, 
holding that the July 8, 1997 press release fully disclosed the risks to the 
market and, therefore, because there was no appreciable decline in 
AHP’s stock price immediately thereafter, the alleged misstatement was 
immaterial as a matter of law.111 
In an opinion by then-Judge Alito, the Third Circuit affirmed.112  
Echoing the views of the District Court, Judge Alito analyzed the issue 
not in terms of loss causation, but rather in terms of materiality in an 
efficient market.113  Endorsing the ECMH as orthodoxy, Judge Alito 
stated that in an efficient market such as the New York Stock Exchange, 
where AHP traded its shares, material information is immediately 
incorporated into stock prices.114  As such, “when a stock is traded in an 
efficient market, the materiality of disclosed information may be 
measured post hoc by looking to the movement, in the period 
immediately following disclosure, of the price of the firm’s stock.”115  
Therefore, because AHP’s stock price did not immediately depreciate 
following the July 8, 1997 disclosure—in fact, as then-Judge Alito 
                                                                                                                 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 281. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 275. 
 113. Id. at 281–87. 
 114. Id. at 282 (“In Burlington, however, this Court fashioned a special rule for 
measuring materiality in the context of an efficient securities market.  This rule was 
shaped by the basic economic insight that in an open and developed securities market 
like the New York Stock Exchange, the price of a company’s stock is determined by all 
available information regarding the company and its business.  In such an efficient 
market, ‘information important to reasonable investors . . . is immediately incorporated 
into the stock price.’” (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 
1410, 1417 (3d Cir. 1997) (emphasis added))). 
 115. Id. at 282. 
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pointed out, AHP’s share price rose by $3.00 during the four days 
following the July 8 press release—the misstatements and omissions 
alleged were immaterial as a matter of law.116 
 A decade after Oran, the Second Circuit took a position in In re 
Omnicom Group, Inc. Securities Litigation.117  According to the plaintiff 
class, Omnicom Group—a global advertising firm—entered into a 
transaction with Pegasus Partners II, L.P.—a private equity firm—in the 
first quarter of 2001.118  The entire purpose of the transaction was to 
transfer Omnicom Group’s interests in multiple internet companies, the 
values of which were depreciating rapidly in the wake of the dotcom 
bubble.119  At the time of the transaction, multiple news sources 
commented on the transaction and, similar to the plaintiff class, 
suggested “that it was an attempt to move the internet companies, whose 
value was deteriorating, off Omnicom’s books.”120  In spite of this 
coverage, Omnicom Group’s stock did not exhibit a statistically 
significant drop in price.121  Over a year later, on June 5, 2002, 
Omnicom Group filed a Form 8-K disclosing that an outside director 
who sat on the audit committee resigned from the Board.122  Over the 
course of the next several days, multiple news sources commented on 
the director’s departure.123  On June 12, 2002, the Wall Street Journal 
published the most negative article to date, noting disagreement with the 
internet companies transaction, aggressive accounting habits, possible 
cash flow concerns, an increase in borrowing, and off-balance sheet earn 
out obligations.124  Later that day, Omnicom held a conference call 
during which it concomitantly tried to reassure its investors, while 
admitting that the director in question did resign for the reasons 
                                                                                                                 
 116. Id. at 282–83. 
 117. 597 F.3d 501 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 118. Id. at 504. 
 119. Id. at 505 n.1, 504–05; see also Complaint at 27, In re Omnicom Group, Inc. 
Sec. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (No. 02-CV-4483) (“As a result of the 
serious, other than temporary impairment that had been sustained by its e-services 
investments, Omnicom was required to write-down these investments in accordance 
with GAAP.  But rather than taking these write-downs and suffering the inevitable blow 
to its earnings that resulted from its losing investments, Omnicom perpetrated a scheme 
to move these losses off its books and maintain the façade of continued growth.”). 
 120. In re Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 505. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
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suggested in the Wall Street Journal article.125  In the two days 
following the article, Omnicom’s stock price dropped more than 25% 
relative to trading prices and activity in the market and the industry.126  
Notwithstanding the steep drop in price, on June 13, 2002, a Lehman 
Brothers analyst stated in a report that the previous day’s Wall Street 
Journal article “did not bring up any substantial ‘new’ issues.”127  
Following extensive discovery, the Southern District of New York 
granted Omnicom’s motion for summary judgment, holding that, in light 
of the timing of the disclosures relative to the drop in Omnicom Group’s 
stock price, there existed no issue of material fact and, accordingly, the 
plaintiff could not prove loss causation.128 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed.129  Framing the issue in 
terms of loss causation, rather than following the Third Circuit’s post 
hoc materiality analysis, the Second Circuit stated that the June 6, 2002 
Wall Street Journal article did not properly constitute a corrective 
disclosure because “a negative journalistic characterization of 
previously disclosed facts does not constitute . . . anything but the 
journalists’ opinions.”130  Therefore, because the article contained no 
new “hard fact[s]” and merely commented on facts that were already 
known to the market for over a year, there was no causal connection 
between the article and the drop in price.131  Moreover, because the 
market was aware of the alleged material misrepresentations for more 
than a year and because such “numerous public reports . . . were 
‘promptly digested’ by the market,” the plaintiffs’ theory of loss 
causation was untenable as a matter of law.132 
Strictly interpreted, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Omnicom does 
not require an immediate drop in price.133  Rather, Omnicom stands for 
the narrow proposition that a plaintiff cannot establish loss causation 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id. at 507. 
 126. Id. at 508. 
 127. Id. at 507. 
 128. Id. at 505 (“Several news articles at or near the time reported the Seneca 
transaction and suggested that it was an attempt to move the internet companies, whose 
value was deteriorating off Omnicom’s books.  Indeed, observers expressed these views 
well into 2002.  However, Onmicom’s stock never experienced any statistically 
significant drop in value at or near the time of these news reports.”). 
 129. Id. at 514. 
 130. Id. at 512. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 513. 
 133. Id. at 504. 
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when  a security depreciates over a year after a material misstatement is 
made in a market that “promptly digests” such information.134  However, 
two years earlier in Teamsters Local 445 Freight Division Pension Fund 
v. Bombardier, Inc.,135 the same court, in the context of analyzing 
market efficiency at the class certification stage, stated that “[e]vidence 
that unexpected corporate events or financial releases cause an 
immediate response in the price of a security has been considered . . . 
‘the essence of an efficient market and the foundation for the fraud on 
the market theory.’”136  The Teamsters opinion thus made clear that the 
Second Circuit treats markets as inherently efficient, and, when read in 
conjunction with Omnicom, suggests that corrective disclosures will 
result in immediate price depreciation.137  In turn, immediate price 
depreciation seems to be required to establish loss causation in a Rule 
10b-5 action in the Second Circuit.138 
The most ardent judicial supporter of the immediate price drop 
requirement is Judge Tjoflat of the Eleventh Circuit.139  In his partially-
concurring and partially-dissenting opinion in Thompson v. 
RelationServe Media, Inc.,140  Judge Tjoflat141 argued that a plaintiff 
                                                                                                                 
 134. Id. at 511. 
 135. 546 F.3d 196 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 136. Id. at 207 (quoting Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989)). 
 137. Brief for Former SEC Commissioners and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners’ Petition, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen’s Annuity & Benefit 
Fund of Chi., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2001) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 5172861 at *6 n.5 (“Other 
circuits that follow the [immediate price depreciation approach] include the Second 
Circuit . . . .”). 
 138. Recent case law in the Southern District of New York suggests an even more 
stringent position with respect to loss causation.  See In re China N. E. Petroleum 
Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 819 F. Supp. 2d 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“A plaintiff who 
forgoes a chance to sell at a profit following a corrective disclosure cannot logically 
ascribe a later loss to devaluation caused by the disclosure.”); see also Lyle Roberts, 
Around the Web, THE 10b-5 DAILY (Oct. 21, 2011, 6:01 PM), http://www.the10b-
5daily.com/archives/2011_10.html. 
 139. See Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 639–700 (11th Cir. 
2010) (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 140. 610 F.3d 628, 689–90 (Tjoflat, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 141. It should be noted that this is, at least, Judge Tjoflat’s second major extra-
opinion comment with respect to market efficiency in the context of Rule 10b-5 
litigation.  In a widely cited concurrence in Ross v. Bank South, N.A., 885 F.2d 723 
(11th Cir. 1989), Judge Tjoflat argued in favor of an “economic unmarketability” 
standard for plaintiffs seeking to plead reliance via the fraud-created-the-market theory. 
Id. at 736 (Tjoflat, J., concurring).  The commonality between Judge Tjoflat’s opinions 
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cannot properly demonstrate loss causation when a corrective disclosure 
is made to the market well before the drop in price.  Judge Tjoflat, 
however, goes a step further and states that such arguments are “legally 
frivolous because [they] advance[] an untenable theory of loss 
causation.”142  While Judge Tjoflat’s dissent does not carry the force of 
law, his argument goes so far as to suggest that Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 11 sanctions are appropriate in cases where a decline in price 
does not immediately follow the corrective disclosure.143   
B. IMMEDIATE DEPRECIATION NOT REQUIRED 
In sharp contrast to the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, the 
Ninth Circuit has endorsed a fact-specific rule with respect to loss 
causation and does not draw any bright-line rules based on the 
ECMH.144  In In re Apollo Group, Inc. Securities Litigation, the plaintiff 
class alleged that the for-profit education provider, Apollo Group, made 
material misstatements about a Department of Education (“DOE”) 
investigation regarding its student recruiting policies which ultimately 
resulted in its stock depreciating.145  In August 2003, DOE began 
investigating Apollo about potential violations of student recruiting 
standards mandated by the Higher Education Act.146  Such violations, if 
true, threatened Apollo’s eligibility for Title IV funding.147  On February 
5, 2004, DOE provided Apollo with a report indicating that Apollo had 
violated applicable student recruiting standards.148  On September 7, 
2004, Apollo announced it reached a settlement with DOE for $9.8 
                                                                                                                 
in Thompson and Ross seems to be strict adherence to the ECMH, in both the primary 
and secondary markets. 
 142. Id. at 689. 
 143. Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (allowing the court to issue sanctions in cases 
where parties offer frivolous arguments). 
 144. See, e.g., In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 
WL 3072731, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. 2008), rev’d on other grounds, No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 
5927988 (9th Cir. June 23, 2010); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 
2009); City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 
2005). 
 145. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 
3072731, at *1 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
 146. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 5, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity & 
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *5. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 6. 
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million.149  Apollo’s stock price did not decline.150  One week thereafter, 
no fewer than four widely read newspapers published articles relating to 
Apollo’s recruiting practices and the settlement with the DOE.151  Once 
again, Apollo’s stock price did not decline.152  On September 20, 2004, a 
UBS analyst published a report—containing no new facts—that cast 
Apollo in a negative light and downgraded its buy-sell rating from 
“Neutral” to “Reduce.”153  The next day, Apollo’s stock price dropped 
significantly.154  Following a full trial in the District of Arizona, the jury 
returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff class.155  Thereafter, Apollo 
motioned for judgment as a matter of law notwithstanding the verdict 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b).156  Judge Teilborg 
granted the motion, holding that the UBS report could not constitute a 
corrective disclosure because it disclosed no new facts and, since no 
new facts came to the market after the newspaper articles were 
published approximately a week beforehand, loss causation could not be 
established.157 
In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed.158  Citing its previous holding in In re Gilead Sciences 
Securities Litigation, the court held that a jury could reasonably 
conclude that the UBS report did constitute a corrective disclosure that 
                                                                                                                 
 149. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 6, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 
4655891, at *7. 
 150. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 6–7, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 
4655891, at *8. 
 151. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 7, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 
4655891, at *8. 
 152. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 8, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 
4655891, at *8. 
 153. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 9, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) 
(No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *9. 
 154. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1; Petition for Writ 
of Certiorari at 9, Apollo Grp., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 
4655891, at *9. 
 155. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2008 WL 3072731, at *1–2. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id.  at *2–3. 
 158. In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 08-16971, 2010 WL 5927988 (9th Cir. 
June 23, 2010). 
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provided “additional or more authoritative fraud-related information that 
deflated the stock price.”159  In this regard, the UBS report could 
constitute a corrective disclosure because, although the market had all 
the information contained in the report, the market “failed to appreciate 
[the] significance”160 or the “intensity and credibility” of the information 
previously disclosed.161 
The Fifth Circuit has used a similar fact-specific rule with respect 
to loss causation.  In Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc.,162 the plaintiff class 
alleged that US Unwired—a digital mobile service provider and an 
affiliate of Sprint Wireless—made continuous material misstatements 
regarding its short- and medium-term business prospects.163  Allegedly, 
US Unwired made positive public representations notwithstanding the 
fact that contract obligations with Sprint Wireless, which began in 
September of 2000 at the latest, proved to be “disastrous.”164  Although 
it did publicly disclose details of contract obligations and corresponding 
business plans related to Sprint Wireless, US Unwired “never accurately 
disclosed the known risks involved” and continued to tout its ongoing 
prospects.165  Finally, on March 5, 2002, US Unwired, in its 10-K filing 
with the SEC, disclosed some general risks involved in its obligations to 
Sprint Wireless but “did not disclose the potential magnitude of those 
risks nor the fact that some of those risks had been realized.”166  All the 
while, US Unwired privately pleaded with Sprint Wireless to relieve it 
of obligations that left it “reeling from the damage.”167  Finally, between 
June 6, 2002 and August 13, 2002, multiple disclosures reached the 
market regarding US Unwired’s unprofitable obligations.168  US 
Unwired’s stock price plummeted from $4.94 to $0.90.169  The District 
Court, although it did not clearly articulate a position regarding an 
                                                                                                                 
 159. Id. at *1. 
 160. Id. (citing In re Gilead Scis. Sec. Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2008)). 
 161. Id. at *1 (citing Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 503 (9th Cir. 
1992)). 
 162. 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009). 
 163. Id. at 231. 
 164. Id. at 234. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 236. 
 168. Id. at 231–32 (noting continuous material misstatements regarding two aspects 
of US Unwired’s business: (1) the implementation of a Sprint-backed plan to attract 
new “sub-prime” subscribers and (2) the overall character of US Unwired’s business 
relationship with Sprint). 
 169. Id. 
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immediacy requirement in the context of loss causation, granted US 
Unwired’s motion to dismiss and held, inter alia, that the plaintiff failed 
to adequately plead loss causation.170 
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit held that US Unwired’s shares traded 
in an efficient market and, therefore, US Unwired’s material 
misstatements regarding its business prospects led to an artificially 
inflated stock price.171  However, unlike in Oran and Omnicom, the 
Court held that “loss causation may be pleaded through a series of 
partial disclosures that caused the stock price deflation.”172  
Accordingly, from June 6, 2002 to August 8, 2002, the “truth about the 
artificial inflation of US Unwired’s stock leaked . . . its way into the 
marketplace” and “the final public disclosures completed the revelation 
of the truth.”173  Finally, the Court stated: 
The market could plausibly have had a delayed reaction; a delayed 
reaction can still satisfy the pleading requirements for “loss 
causation” though proof of causation would be more difficult when 
significant time elapses before the market allegedly reacts . . . . The 
actual timing issue is a factual question, and it is not enough to 
dismiss a complaint that alleges a specific causal link . . . under Rule 
12(b)(6).174 
In no uncertain terms, the Fifth Circuit noted that markets, even 
those that traditionally behave efficiently,175 do not always immediately 
incorporate news into price, and such a delayed reaction can still satisfy 
the loss causation pleading requirement.176 
In addition to the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, the Sixth Circuit also 
does not appear to require an immediate depreciation in price.  In City of 
                                                                                                                 
 170. See id. at 261 n.31, 266. 
 171. Id. at 258–59. 
 172. Id. at 261 n.31. 
 173. Id. at 259, 261. 
 174. See id. at 266 n.33 (citation omitted). 
 175. The Court in Lormand notes that during the time frame between the material 
misstatements and the purchases of shares by the plaintiff class, US Unwired stock 
traded in an efficient market. See id. at 259.  Although this statement has the potential 
to confuse the reader, it is important to keep in mind that the Court’s commentary 
regarding market efficiency in this context refers to the reliance stage of a securities 
fraud class action. See id. (“[D]efendants’ material omissions . . . caused US Unwired’s 
stock prices to artificially inflate.”).  The Court’s discussion of loss causation, as noted, 
makes clear that markets can plausibly have delayed reactions. Id. at 266 n.33. 
 176. See id. at 266 n.33, 267–68. 
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Monroe Employees Retirement Systems v. Bridgestone Corp.,177 the 
Sixth Circuit framed the issue of loss causation in the context of the 
ECMH.178  In fact, the Sixth Circuit even quoted the Third Circuit and 
stated that “information important to reasonable investors . . . is 
immediately incorporated into stock prices.”179  Even so, the Sixth 
Circuit “measured the stock price reaction over a six-week period.”180  
In this regard, even though the Court’s language implies otherwise, the 
fact that it measured damages during a period post-dating the corrective 
disclosure strongly suggests that that Sixth Circuit, like the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits, favors a fact-specific rule with respect to loss causation.   
 
III. COURTS SHOULD FOLLOW THE FIFTH  
CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN LORMAND 
 
In analyzing the question of how quickly the price of an equity 
security must depreciate following the release of a corrective disclosure 
to the market, courts should look to the Fifth Circuit’s reasoning in 
Lormand and recognize that, even in the context of markets where news 
is most often immediately incorporated into price, sometimes markets 
for securities behave inefficiently.  Adopting such a fact-specific rule (1) 
comports with contemporary economic research calling into question the 
ECMH; (2) properly and separately analyzes each element of Rule 10b-
5; and (3) is consistent with other landmark holdings in Rule 10b-5 
litigation, all of which have rejected bright-line rules in favor of fact-
specific inquiries.  Finally, such a rule neither extends Section 10(b) or 
Rule 10b-5 beyond their intended purpose, nor is it a form of investors’ 
insurance. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
 177. 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 178. Id. at 675–76. 
 179. Id. at 676 (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 
1425 (3d Cir. 1997)). 
 180. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity 
& Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *20 (citing 
City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d at 651). 
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A. CONTEMPORARY CRITICISM OF THE EFFICIENT  
CAPITAL MARKETS HYPOTHESIS 
 
 Since Fama’s seminal work in 1970, several scholars and 
commentators have called into question the accuracy of the ECMH.181  
The scholarship is extensive and challenges the ECMH in many forms: 
complex statistical studies identifying persistent pricing anomalies;182 
the burgeoning field of behavioral economics, particularly in the context 
of noise theory;183 and historical instances of pricing bubbles in 2000 
and 2008 which highlight blatant instances of incorrect valuation.184  
Even Fama himself, who maintains that the ECMH is the best analytical 
tool with which to analyze market movement,185 has stated that the 
ECMH “[l]ike all models . . . is a faulty description of price 
formation.”186 
Notwithstanding vigorous arguments to the contrary, the ECMH 
maintains staunch supporters.187  Michael Jensen, who famously referred 
                                                                                                                 
 181. See, e.g., FOX, supra note 3; Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market 
Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635 (2003); Ming 
Deng, Death of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (20th Australasian Finance & Banking 
Conference 2007 Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=1006716; William K.S. Wang, Some Arguments that the Stock Market Is 
Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 341 (1985); Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph 
Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 
393 (1980); Alan Kirman, Economic Theory and the Crisis, VOXEU (Nov. 14, 2009), 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/economic-theory-and-crisis; Brian Milner, Sun Finally 
Sets on Notion That Markets Are Rational, GLOBE AND MAIL (July 3, 2009, 7:40 PM), 
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-investor/ 
investment-ideas/sun-finally-sets-on-notion-that-markets-are-rational/article4301916/; 
Greg Hoffman, Paul the Octopus Proves Buffett Was Right, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD 
(July 14, 2010), available at http://www.smh.com.au/business/paul-the-octopus-proves-
buffett-was-right-20100714-10air.html; Justin Fox, Is the Market Rational? No, Say the 
Experts. But Neither Are You – So Don’t Go Thinking You Can Outsmart It, FORTUNE 
(Dec. 9, 2002). 
 182. See, e.g., Wang, supra note 181; Grossman & Stiglitz, supra note 181. 
 183. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 4, at 858–89; Stout, supra note 181, at 665–
66. 
 184. See FOX, supra note 3. 
 185. Fama, Adjustment of Stock Prices, supra note 20, at 1. 
 186. Id. 
 187. See, e.g., id.; Michael C. Jensen, The Takeover Controversy: Analysis and 
Evidence, MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J., Summer 1986, AT 6, 11; Fama, supra note 3, at 387; 
Langevoort, supra note 4, at 858–89. 
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to the ECMH as the most empirically evidenced theory in economics, 
has reinforced his sweeping comment by stating “there is no better 
documented proposition in any of the social sciences.”188  The ECMH 
has even garnered general support from Daniel Kanheman, a Nobel 
Laureate psychologist whose work has greatly influenced behavioral 
economics.189  When recently asked about market efficiency, Kanheman 
stated that “[w]hat the market does do very well is that it cancels 
random errors.”190 
Notwithstanding the fervent debate, the ECMH remains sacrosanct 
in the legal context.191  According to Donald Langevoort, the legal 
profession behaves as though “economists proved the [ECMH thirty 
years ago] and moved on to other topics entirely, so that all that is left is 
for the law to come into conformity with this intellectual orthodoxy.”192  
While the purpose of this paper is neither to discredit the ECMH nor to 
take a side in the debate regarding its accuracy, it does seem counter-
intuitive for the courts to draw strict categorical rules based on an 
unsettled economic theory.193  Any further strict adherence to the ECMH 
in an abstract, categorical sense, contributes only to continued willful 
blindness on the part of the legal community.194  Accordingly, courts 
should recognize, as economists and financial professionals long-since 
have, that securities prices sometimes do behave inefficiently195 and, in 
such instances, plaintiffs should have the opportunity to prove loss 
causation over time in an inefficient market.196 
                                                                                                                 
 188. Jensen, supra note 192, at 11; see also Langevoort, supra note 4, at 853 n.8. 
 189. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1175, 1175–77 (1997); Colin Camerer, Samuel Issacharoff, George Lowenstein, Ted 
O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral Economics 
and the Case for “Asymmetric Paternalism,” 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211, 1215 n.14 
(2003). 
 190. Power Lunch: Interview with Daniel Kanheman (CNBC television broadcast 
Oct. 28, 2011), available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000053951. 
 191. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 855. 
 192. Id. 
 193. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1286–87 (D.N.J. 1989) (“It is not 
logical to draw bright-line tests . . . to assist fact finders in determining whether a stock 
trades in an ‘open and efficient market.’”). 
 194. Cf. Langevoort, supra note 4, at 854–55. 
 195. See supra notes 177–182 and accompanying text. 
 196. See, e.g., In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 
WL 3072731, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. 2008); Lormand v. US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 
(5th Cir. 2009); City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 
(6th Cir. 2005). 
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B. TEMPORALLY ACCURATE AND INDIVIDUAL  
ANALYSIS OF EACH 10b-5 ELEMENT 
 
At least four events must occur in every meritorious Rule 10b-5 
claim: (1) ABC Company makes a material misstatement or omission at 
time t1; (2) Investor X purchases securities of ABC Company based on 
presumed reliance197 on ABC Company’s material misstatement or 
omission at time t2; (3) a corrective disclosure is released with respect to 
ABC Company’s material misstatement or omission at time t3; and (4) 
Investor X sells her ABC Company securities for a loss at time t4.198  Of 
course, each of these events occurs at a different point in time under the 
condition that t1 < t2 < t3 < t4.  Depending upon which part of the country 
the Rule 10b-5 complaint is filed, however, this scenario will be 
analyzed very differently.199 
Within the Third Circuit, the foundational question is whether the 
market is efficient.200  Oftentimes, the market will be assumed efficient 
because the complaint will plead reliance based on the FOTM and the 
defendant will not rebut that presumption.201 Assuming an efficient 
market, the only other relevant question is whether the market price of 
ABC Company’s securities depreciated immediately following the 
release of the corrective disclosure (at time t3).202  If the answer is yes, 
then the plaintiff has established materiality and, most likely, loss 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Reliance could also be pled directly, i.e., Investor X actually read the material 
misstatement and decided to purchase based upon, inter alia, such information. 
 198. In this hypothetical situation, the transaction is structured chronologically as a 
purchase and sale.  The hypothetical could just as easily be inverted as a sale and 
purchase.  If the transaction in question involves a short sale, however, loss causation is 
a much more complex issue.  See Wilamowsky v. Take-Two Interactive Software, Inc., 
No. 10-cv-7471, 2011 WL 4542754 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2011); see also Lyle Roberts, 
Win Big or Go Home, THE 10B-5 DAILY (Oct. 28, 2011, 6:20 PM), http://www.the10b-
5daily.com/archives/001156.html. 
 199. Compare In re Omnicom Group Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 
2010), Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628 (11th Cir. 2010), and 
Oran v. Stafford, 226 F.3d 275 (3d Cir. 2000), with In re Apollo Grp., Inc. Sec. Litig., 
No. CV 04-2147-PHX-JAT, 2008 WL 3072731, at *2–3 (D. Ariz. 2008); Lormand v. 
US Unwired, Inc., 565 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 2009); City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. 
Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 200. See Oran, 226 F.3d 275. 
 201. See Silverman, supra note 70, at 1798 (commenting on the effective necessity 
of presumptive reliance in the context of securities fraud class actions). 
 202. See Fischel, supra note 3, at 4; see also Oran, 226 F.3d 275, 282; In re 
Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997). 
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causation.203  If the answer is no, then the alleged material misstatement 
was immaterial in the first instance and the issue of loss causation is 
moot.204 
Within the Second and the Eleventh Circuits, the analysis is largely 
the same except that the post hoc determination of materiality is 
replaced by consideration of the element loss causation.205  Assuming an 
efficient market at the time of purchase (at time t2), the only remaining 
question is whether the market price of ABC Company’s securities 
depreciated immediately following the release of the corrective 
disclosure.206  If the answer is yes, then the plaintiff has most likely 
established loss causation.207  If the answer is no, then the plaintiff 
cannot demonstrate loss causation and the case will likely be 
dismissed.208 
The common theme running through both these analyses is that 
market efficiency is only considered in the context of reliance at the 
time of purchase (at time t2) and is not considered in the context of loss 
causation at the time of sale (at time t3).209  However unlikely, it is 
                                                                                                                 
 203. See, e.g., Oran, 226 F.3d at 275; Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1410; see also 
Fischel, supra note 3, at 4. 
 204. See, e.g., Oran, 226 F.3d at 282; Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425; see also 
Fischel, supra note 3, at 4. 
 205. See, e.g., In re Omnicom Group Inc. Sec. Litig., 597 F.3d 501, 509 (2d Cir. 
2010), Thompson v. RelationServe Media, Inc., 610 F.3d 628, 680, 689 (11th Cir. 
2010).  
 206. See, e.g., Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509; Thompson, 610 F.3d at 680, 689. 
 207. See, e.g., Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509; Thompson, 610 F.3d at 628. 
 208. See, e.g., Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 509; Thompson, 610 F.3d at 628. 
 209. See supra note 96 and accompanying text; see also, Omnicom, 597 F.3d at 
510–11 (“With regard to reliance, appellant’s complaint invokes the presumption of 
reliance based on the [FOTM] . . . .  [It further alleges that] the market for Omnicom’s 
securities promptly digested current information regarding Omnicom from all publicly 
available sources and reflected such information in Omnicom’s stock price.  Having 
sought to establish investor reliance by the [FOTM] theory, appellant faces a difficult 
task . . . .  In short, appellant must concede that the numerous public reports on the 
Seneca transaction were ‘promptly digested’ by the market and ‘reflected . . . in 
Omnicom’s stock price’ in 2001 while seeking to recover for a stock price decline a 
year later in 2002”) (citation omitted); Thompson, 610 F.3d at 691( “[T]he efficient 
market theory–on which Jacoby relies–posits that all publicly available information is 
reflected in the market price of the security.  As of July 14, 2005, the market knew that 
Media sold $340,000 worth of stock to five Indiana investors . . . .  As of June 16, 2005, 
the market knew that Summit could act as a finder and would be paid a seven percent 
finder’s fee . . . . And as of March 20, 2006, the market knew that Media paid Summit a 
total ‘success fee’ of $28,500 in connection with its private placement of common stock 
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possible that the market for a particular security exhibits semi-strong 
form characteristics at time t2 but, for any one of a number of reasons 
posited by behavioral economists,210 exhibits weak form characteristics 
at time t3.211 Notwithstanding this possibility, a complaint alleging such 
facts in the Second, Third, and, possibly, Eleventh Circuits would be 
more vulnerable to dismissal as a matter of law.212 
To avoid such a result, courts should examine each element of Rule 
10b-5 securities fraud separately and in chronological order.  The first 
element to examine is materiality.213  The court must assess whether 
there is “a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact 
would have been viewed by a reasonable investor as having significantly 
altered the total mix of information made available.”214  Logically absent 
from this definition is any mention of market efficiency. Reporting 
companies maintain a duty to disclose material information to their 
investors regardless of the efficiency characteristics exhibited by the 
market for their securities.215  Accordingly, courts, like reporting 
companies, should analyze the materiality of information at time t1, the 
                                                                                                                 
. . . . Accordingly, the market had absorbed this information well before the May 23 
amendment.  If not, those shares were not being traded in an ‘impersonal, well-
developed’ and efficient market, as required for the application of the fraud-on-the-
market doctrine”); Oran, 226 F.3d at 282 (“[W]hen a stock is traded in an efficient 
market, the materiality of disclosed information may be measured post hoc by looking 
to the movement, in the period immediately following the disclosure, of the price of the 
firm’s stock.  Because in an efficient market ‘the concept of materiality translates into 
information that alters the price of the firm’s stock,’ if a company’s disclosure of 
information has no effect on stock prices, ‘it follows that the information disclosed . . . 
was immaterial as a matter of law.’” (quoting Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1425); see also 
Fischel, supra note 3, at 4. 
 210. See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 4, at 858–89; Stout, supra note 186, at 665–
66. 
 211. See supra notes 3, 83 and accompanying text. 
 212. See, e.g., Oran, 226 F.3d at 282; Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1419; Omnicom, 597 
F.3d at 512–13; Thompson, 610 F.3d at 689–90 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). 
 213. Given a separate analysis of each element of Rule 10b-5, the element of 
materiality logically must be the first inquiry. See generally Dura Pharm., Inc. v. 
Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341 (2005) (listing a material misrepresentation as the first 
element of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud). 
 214. TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). 
 215. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 229, 230, 239–40, 249 (2012); see also HAZEN, supra note 
38, §§ 3.9[8], 12.9[10], 12.19; COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 630–49. 
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time when a misstatement or omission is disclosed to the market.216  In 
so doing, courts would be faithfully following the rule handed down in 
TSC Industries and undertaking the same analysis required of reporting 
companies.  In adhering to such a rule, certain information that is 
correlated to significant price movement at time t3 may be deemed 
immaterial at time t1.  Such a result is both litigant-neutral and logically 
sound.  Just as an inefficient market cannot render material information 
immaterial, neither can an efficient market render immaterial 
information material. 
The next step is analyzing reliance.217  Assuming the plaintiff 
pleads reliance based on the FOTM, the court should question whether 
at the time of purchase (at time t2), the market for ABC Company’s 
securities exhibited semi-strong form efficiency characteristics.218  If so, 
then reliance has been demonstrated and the analysis should proceed.  If 
not, then the court need further analyze when the market incorporated 
the material misstatement into the price of ABC Company’s securities 
(at time t2).219  In the context of a class action, such an analysis will 
likely reduce the size of the class because, rather than indiscriminately 
beginning the class period at time t2, the class period would begin at the 
time that the market for ABC Company’s securities actually 
incorporated the misstatement into the price (at time t2’).220  Such an 
approach, in addition to being truth-seeking, would provide the courts 
with a tool to precisely define plaintiff classes, rather than using an 
over-inclusive standard. 
  Finally, the court must analyze loss causation.221  The operative 
question, as outlined in Dura, is whether the revelation of the fraud to 
                                                                                                                 
 216. See TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449; see also Regulation FD, 17 C.F.R. § 
243.100(a) (2010) (requiring reporting companies to remedy the inadvertent disclosure 
of material non-public information by prompt public disclosure); Form 8-K, available 
at http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form8-k.pdf. 
 217. The element of “connection to a purchase or sale” is effectively analyzed at this 
step as well. 
 218. A consideration of whether the market exhibited semi-strong market 
characteristics is appropriate because, in such markets, the prices of securities reflect all 
publicly available information about such securities. See supra notes 10–29 and 
accompanying text. 
 219. This fact pattern assumes that t2 < t2’ < t3. 
 220. Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity & 
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891 at *31–32. 
 221. Given a separate analysis of each element of Rule 10b-5, the element of loss 
causation logically will be the last inquiry, not including a calculation of damages.  See, 
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the marketplace caused the relevant economic loss.222  As such, courts 
should question whether the market for ABC Company’s securities 
exhibited semi-strong form efficiency characteristics at the time of the 
corrective disclosure (at time t3).223  If so, then all that remains is for the 
court to measure damages based on the depreciation in price of ABC 
Company’s securities from time of purchase (at time t2)224 to time of sale  
(at time t4).225  If not, then the court need further analyze when the 
market began to price the corrective disclosure into ABC Company’s 
securities. 
The question logically turns to how courts should determine if a 
market exhibits semi-strong form characteristics.  Perhaps the most 
common judicial analytical framework was outlined in Cammer v. 
Bloom.226  In Cammer, the Court set out five characteristics common to 
an efficient market: (1) weekly trading volume; (2) the number of 
securities analysts following the company in question; (3) the number of 
market makers with respect to the security in question; (4) the 
company’s eligibility to file a Form S-3 Registration Statement; and (5) 
“empirical facts showing a cause and effect relationship between 
unexpected corporate events or financial releases and an immediate 
response in stock price.”227  In addition, other courts have considered 
factors such as market capitalization; bid-ask spreads on the company’s 
securities; the company’s outstanding float; and the percentage of equity 
securities owned by company insiders.228  These factors, albeit important 
                                                                                                                 
e.g., Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342 (2005) (listing loss causation as an 
element of Rule 10b-5 securities fraud). 
 222. Id. at 341–42. 
 223. See supra note 209–11 and accompanying text. 
 224. Of course, if the market did not price in the material misstatement at time t2, 
then damages should be measured from time t2’, i.e., the time that the market priced in 
the material misstatement, to time t4.  Such a scenario is reserved for situations in which 
the market for ABC Company securities exhibits weak form characteristics at least 
between times t1 and t2’. 
 225. See HAZEN, supra note 38, § 12.12; COX ET AL., supra note 36, at 716–19. 
 226. 711 F. Supp. 1264 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 227. Id. at 1286–87. 
 228. See In re Healthsouth Corp. Sec. Litig., 261 F.R.D. 616, 632 (N.D. Ala. 2009) 
(citing Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005). 
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proxies for market efficiency, should ultimately give way to a battle of 
the experts,229 as it beyond the expertise of the courts.230   
C. CONSISTENCY WITH LANDMARK RULE 10b-5 CASES 
Adopting a fact-specific rule in the context of a non-immediate 
price reaction also comports with Supreme Court precedent in the Rule 
10b-5 context, which has repeatedly eschewed bright-line rules.231  For 
example, in Basic, the Court was asked to hold that preliminary merger 
discussions are immaterial as a matter of law and, therefore, do not give 
rise to a reporting company’s duty to disclose.232  The Court declined 
such a holding and adopted the TSC Industries reasonable investor 
test.233 
More recently, the Court declined to adopt a bright-line rule on the 
issue of materiality in Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano.234  In 
Matrixx, Matrixx Initiatives, a pharmaceutical company, received a 
statistically insignificant amount of adverse event reports for its best-
selling drug Zicam, which accounted for up to 70% of its sales 
revenue.235  The adverse event reports claimed that Zicam caused 
anosmia—the loss of the sense of smell—in several patients.236  Matrixx 
Initiatives investigated the matter but did not disclose the reports to its 
shareholders.237  Once this information made its way to the market, 
Matrixx Initiatives’ price fell significantly.238  Matrixx Initiatives argued 
that because the number of adverse event reports was statistically 
insignificant, the information was immaterial as a matter of law.239  In an 
opinion by Justice Sotomayor, the Court, relying heavily on the 
                                                                                                                 
 229. See generally Andrew M. Erdlen, Timing Is Everything: Markets, Loss, and 
Proof of Causation in Fraud on the Market Actions, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 877 (2011); 
but see Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 88, at 196. 
 230. See Kaufman & Wunderlich, supra note 88, at 207–08 (discussing the primacy 
of expert testimony to interpret market movements for courts in securities litigation). 
 231. See, e.g., TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438 (1976); Basic Inc. v. 
Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988); Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 131 S. Ct. 1309 
(2011); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 232. Basic, 485 U.S. at 231–32. 
 233. Id.  
 234. 131 S. Ct. 1321 (2011). 
 235. Id. at 1313–14. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. at 1315. 
 238. Id. at 1316. 
 239. Id. at 1318–19. 
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reasoning in Basic, refused to adopt such a bright-line rule and 
reasserted the importance of the fact-specific inquiry, noting that “[a]ny 
approach that designates a single fact or occurrence as always 
determinative of an inherently fact-specific finding . . . must necessarily 
be overinclusive or underinclusive.”240 
In the context of scienter, the Supreme Court has also adopted a 
fact-specific rule.  In Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,241 the 
Court considered the proper standard for pleading with particularity 
facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter as required by the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (the “PSLRA”).242  In 
Tellabs, the respondent argued for dismissal of the complaint because it 
did not sufficiently allege that Tellabs’ CEO had a pecuniary motive for 
making such misleading statements and, therefore, did not sufficiently 
allege scienter.243  In an opinion by Justice Ginsburg, the Court, while 
acknowledging that motive does factor into the analysis, disagreed and 
held that “[t]o qualify as ‘strong’ within the [PSLRA] . . . an inference 
of scienter must be more than merely plausible or reasonable—it must 
be cogent and at least as compelling as any opposing inference of non-
fraudulent intent.”244 Just as in TSC Industries, Basic, and Matrixx, the 
Court rejected a simultaneously over-inclusive and under-inclusive 
bright-line rule, in favor of a fact-specific, truth-seeking inquiry.245 
Of course, none of these holdings is dispositive on the issue of non-
immediate price depreciation in the context of loss causation.  However, 
they do demonstrate a clear preference on the part of the Supreme Court 
to avoid bright-line rules that are necessarily imprecise and very likely 
preclusive of some meritorious claims.246  Accordingly, because the 
                                                                                                                 
 240. Id. at 1318 (quoting Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227–29 (1988)). 
 241. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308 (2007). 
 242. Id. at 313; see Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 
104-67, § 101(b) 109 Stat. 737, 747 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) 
(2006)).  
 243. See Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325. 
 244. Id. at 314. 
 245. See id. (“[C]ourts must consider the complaint in its entirety, as well as other 
sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, in 
particular, documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of 
which a court may take judicial notice.  The inquiry, as several Courts of Appeals have 
recognized, is whether all of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong 
inference of scienter, not whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, 
meets that standard.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 246. See supra Part III.C. 
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question of how quickly the prices of equity securities incorporate 
information into price is an imprecise inquiry, courts should not adopt 
any rule that would preclude a plaintiff from succeeding on a Rule 10b-5 
claim as a matter of law simply because of a time lag in price 
depreciation.247 
 
D. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF A BRIGHT-LINE RULE 
 
Critics of the fact-specific rule are likely to argue that such an 
approach is an extension of Rule 10b-5 that (1) gives plaintiffs the 
benefit of a presumed efficient market at reliance248 and the presumption 
of an inefficient market at loss causation;249 (2) raises concerns 
regarding class formation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23;250 
(3) improperly replaces informational efficiency with fundamental value 
efficiency;251 and (4) is contrary to Congress’s desire to limit private 
securities claims as expressed by the PSLRA.252 
The most likely counter-argument to the proposed fact-specific rule 
is that it will be overly plaintiff-friendly.  In other words, it provides 
plaintiffs with the benefit of a presumed efficient market without any of 
the logically following disadvantages.253  As counsel for Apollo argued, 
“[i]t posits a market that is perfectly efficient, speedy, and omniscient 
for the purposes of granting plaintiffs the enormous benefit of the 
presumption of reliance on misrepresentations, but horribly inefficient, 
sluggish, and doltish in response to corrective disclosures.”254  Even 
more forcefully, securities lawyer Tower Snow has, in the context of 
Apollo, argued that “[t]he courts can’t rely on the efficient market theory 
for the purposes of . . . reliance . . . and then ignore its underpinnings for 
                                                                                                                 
 247. Cf. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 342–43 (2005). 
 248. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 224. 
 249. See infra note 253–61 and accompanying text. 
 250. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity & 
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891 at *14. 
 251.  See infra notes 273–82 and accompanying text. 
 252.  See infra notes 283–86 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra Part II.A; see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. 
Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 
4655891, at *5. 
 254. Id.  
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purposes of evaluating loss causation.  Either one embraces the theory or 
one does not.”255 
It is tempting, for purposes of simplicity and judicial economy, to 
adopt a one-size-fits-all approach to Rule 10b-5 analysis.256  Daniel 
Fischel has argued that in the context of an efficient market, “there is no 
need . . . for separate inquiries into materiality, reliance, [loss] causation, 
and damages . . . [and the] relevant inquiry in open-market transactions 
should be whether the market price was in fact artificially affected by 
false information.”257  Companies and investors alike could also benefit 
from the degree of market certainty that a symmetrical, litigant-neutral 
rule would provide.  Given the volatility in today’s markets and the 
fragility of the global economy, such an argument in favor of certainty 
and stability is all the more enticing.258 
These criticisms, however, fail to take an individual, temporally 
accurate approach to Rule 10b-5 analyses.  The one-size-fits-all 
approach would be acceptable if, from the time of misstatement to the 
time of sale at an economic loss (i.e., from time t1 to time t4), the market 
for the securities in question exhibited semi-strong form characteristics 
at all times.259  There is, however, no way to verify semi-strong form 
market behavior without an ex post analysis of relevant pricing data.  
Semi-strong form behavior should not be assumed.260  Accordingly, to 
ensure a result that approaches the true movement of the market and the 
reasons behind such movement, courts should examine market 
                                                                                                                 
 255. Kevin LaCroix, Guest Post: Tower Snow Comments on the Ninth Circuit’s 
Apollo Group Opinion, D&O DIARY (June 28, 2010), http://www.dandodiary.com/ 
2010/06/articles/securities-litigation/guest-post-tower-snow-comments-on-the-ninth-
circuits-apollo-group-opinion/. 
 256. See generally Fischel, supra note 3, at 13. 
 257. Fischel, supra note 3, at 13. 
 258. As of the date of this writing, the 50 day moving average of the Chicago Board 
of Options Exchange Volatility Index, colloquially known as the “VIX” or the “fear 
index” is just below 35.00. See (VIX) Volatility (S & P 500), CBOE, 
http://www.cboe.com/DelayedQuote/DQBeta.aspx (insert “vix” into Get Quote) 
(accessed Nov. 6, 2011); see also Volatility Indexes at CBOE, CBOE (Jan. 2012) 
http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/pdf/VolatilityIndexQRG2012-01-30.pdf (“CBOE 
Volatility Index (VIX®), based on S&P 500 Index Options, is considered by many to 
be the world’s premier barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility.”).   
 259. Cf. Fischel, supra note 3, at 13. 
 260. See supra notes 176–81 and accompanying text. 
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efficiency both at time of purchase (at time t2) and at the time of 
corrective disclosure (at time t3).261     
A second likely argument against the fact-specific rule approach is 
that it creates confusion at the class certification stage in the context of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.262  The most obvious hypothetical 
fact pattern in this regard relates to investors who purchase ABC 
Company securities after a corrective disclosure is made (i.e., after time 
t3) but before the market—in this instance exhibiting weak form market 
characteristics—incorporates the information and yields an economic 
loss (i.e., before time t4).263  Such investors, if they were permitted to 
participate in the plaintiff class, would have free insurance on their 
investment because any losses would be recouped in damages.264  
Despite being a plaintiff-friendly rule, such an outcome appears at odds 
with considerable precedent.265 
This argument, while persuasive in the abstract, is overblown.  
First, because the vast majority of Rule 10b-5 cases settle, very few 
investors would receive full payment in the form of damages.266  
Second, regardless of whether the case is disposed of via settlement or 
verdict, investors will not recoup their investment in full because legal 
fees will temper any settlement or damages.267  In the case of a 
contingency fee, the final figure could see a hair cut of up to 40%.268  
Third, the fact-specific rule is very unlikely to incentivize opportunistic 
investors who are aware of the misstatement but nonetheless purchase 
                                                                                                                 
 261. See supra notes 216, 221 and accompanying text. 
 262. FED R. CIV. P. 23. 
 263. Cf. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Apollo Grp., Inc. v. Policemen's Annuity & 
Benefit Fund, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011) (No. 10-649), 2010 WL 4655891, at *14. 
 264. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 252 (1988) (White, J., 
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 267. See Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 84 (1990); see also Blanchard v. Bergeron, 
489 U.S. 87 (1989). 
 268. See, e.g., Venegas, 495 U.S. at 84 (discussing contingent fee arrangements in 
which the plaintiffs’ lawyers take as much as forty percent of the gross recovery). 
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shares expecting either a profit or damages.  As an initial matter, 
affirmative proof of non-reliance is sufficient to rebut a presumption of 
reliance.269  While such rebuttal is very unlikely,270 it is possible and 
may well deter certain opportunistic investors.  More practically, this 
type of litigation-insured investment is unlikely because it assumes a 
foolish investment strategy.  Such an investor would be betting on the 
likelihood of damages in a case that is unlikely to be resolved 
expeditiously.  Such an investor also would be betting on the ability of 
the plaintiff class to plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong 
inference of scienter.  Finally, because the fact-specific rule requires a 
more nuanced approach to class formation, the number of investors who 
purchased shares following the misstatement, but prior to the price 
inflation, who are ineligible to join the class should, in the aggregate, 
offset any number of investors who purchase after the corrective 
disclosure but before the price depreciation who are eligible to join the 
class.271  In other words, excluding investors that purchased ABC 
Company securities after time t2 but before time t2’ should offset the 
inclusion of investors who purchased ABC Company securities after 
time t3 but before time t3’.272 
A third likely argument against the fact-specific rule is that it 
creates investors’ insurance by substituting information-arbitrage 
efficiency (“IA Efficiency”) for fundamental-valuation efficiency (“FV 
                                                                                                                 
 269. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 245; Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 
128, 153–54 (1972); see also Oldham, supra note 83, at 1005; Silverman, supra note 
70, at 1800 nn.116–18. 
 270. See Cammer v. Bloom, 711 F. Supp. 1264, 1288 (D.N.J. 1989). 
 271. Concerns over perverse incentives remain.  If the fact-specific rule is adopted, 
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 272. This fact pattern assumes that t3 < t3’. 
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Efficiency”).273  The price of a security is IA Efficient if it reflects all 
publicly available information with respect to that security.274  In this 
respect, a security that is IA Efficient is identical to a security that 
exhibits semi-strong market characteristics.275  To be FV Efficient, 
however, the price of a security must accurately reflect its true value.276  
A staunch defender of the ECMH might argue that a time lag between a 
corrective disclosure and price depreciation is demonstrative of the 
market’s lack of FV Efficiency but not the market’s lack of IA 
Efficiency.277  Accepting such an argument as true, it follows that the 
fact-specific rule would allow investors to recover on the basis of a 
market’s FV Inefficiency while concomitantly benefiting from the same 
market’s IA Efficiency.278 
First, it is important to note that, although it has not explicitly 
differentiated between IA and FV efficiency, the Supreme Court used 
language more commonly attributed to IA Efficiency in Basic.279  
Rather, the Supreme Court and the circuit courts have analyzed market 
efficiency without specifically referring to either IA or FV efficiency.280  
Secondarily, even assuming that Rule 10b-5 fraud claims turn on IA and 
not FV Efficiency, it is not possible to determine whether a particular 
price depreciation resulted from IA Efficiency or FV Efficiency ex ante 
at the motion to dismiss stage.281  Accordingly, the courts should leave 
the granular determination of why the price of a security depreciated to 
expert witnesses.282 
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Finally, opponents are likely to argue that, because determinations 
of market efficiency will often require expert testimony, the fact-specific 
rule runs contrary to the Congress’s intent in limiting frivolous strike 
suits at the motion to dismiss stage as expressed by the PSLRA.283  As 
an initial matter, the fact-specific rule recognizes, as did the Court in 
Lormand, that “proof of causation would be more difficult when 
significant time elapses before the market allegedly reacts.”284  This 
built-in, rebuttable presumption of market efficiency ensures, at least in 
part, that this approach will not be abused by the plaintiff’s bar.  
Additionally, and perhaps even more importantly, the element of 
scienter protects against unintended consequences.285  Because plaintiffs 
need to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter, concerns 
related to frivolity are superfluous.286   
CONCLUSION 
Due to economic scholarship calling into question the accuracy of 
the ECMH, the practical reality of imprecise market behavior, and the 
importance of adopting and maintaining fact-specific, truth-seeking 
rules, the courts should follow the Fifth Circuit’s guidance in Lormand 
with respect to the question of non-immediate price depreciation in 10b-
5 litigation.  In addition to ensuring that the federal court system will, to 
the extent practicable, seek to determine the actual cause of market 
movements, the fact-specific rule provides a consistent, litigant-neutral 
mechanism to analyze alleged fraud in the securities markets.  While the 
ECMH may be an effective analytical tool in certain, specific 
circumstances, it nevertheless remains a hypothesis and should be 
treated as such in the context of Rule 10b-5 litigation.  For the courts to 
continue to treat the ECMH as economic dogma borders on 
irresponsible.  This strict adherence to the ECMH is tantamount to 
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“repeating what [was] read in antiquated textbooks,”287 to the detriment 
of investors with potentially meritorious claims. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 287. Street Signs: Interview with Stephen Roach (CNBC television broadcast Oct. 
27, 2011), available at http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000052760. 
